A Class of Mean-field LQG Games with Partial Information by Huang, Jianhui & Wang, Shujun
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
58
59
v1
  [
ma
th.
OC
]  
24
 M
ar 
20
14
A Class of Mean-field LQG Games with Partial Information
Jianhui Huang∗ Shujun Wang †
October 8, 2018
Abstract
The large-population system consists of considerable small agents whose individual behavior and
mass effect are interrelated via their state-average. The mean-field game provides an efficient way to
get the decentralized strategies of large-population system when studying its dynamic optimizations.
Unlike other large-population literature, this current paper possesses the following distinctive fea-
tures. First, our setting includes the partial information structure of large-population system which
is practical from real application standpoint. Specially, two cases of partial information structure are
considered here: the partial filtration case (see Section 2, 3) where the available information to agents
is the filtration generated by an observable component of underlying Brownian motion; the noisy ob-
servation case (Section 4) where the individual agent can access an additive white-noise observation
on its own state. Also, it is new in filtering modeling that our sensor function may depend on the
state-average. Second, in both cases, the limiting state-averages become random and the filtering
equations to individual state should be formalized to get the decentralized strategies. Moreover, it is
also new that the limit average of state filters should be analyzed here. This makes our analysis very
different to the full information arguments of large-population system. Third, the consistency condi-
tions are equivalent to the wellposedness of some Riccati equations, and do not involve the fixed-point
analysis as in other mean-field games. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium properties are also presented.
Key words: Consistency condition, ǫ-Nash equilibrium, Large-population system, Mean-field games,
Noisy observation, Partial information.
1 Introduction
The starting point of our work is the large-population systems which are strongly grounded in various
fields. The most significant feature of large-population systems is the existence of a large number of
negligible agents that are coupled in their dynamics and (or) cost functionals via state average. Due to
this highly complicated coupling feature, it is intractable for the agents to study the centralized strate-
gies of large-population system. Instead, it is more appropriate to discuss the decentralized strategies
which encompass the individual state and some off-line quantities only. For this purpose, one efficient
methodology is the associated mean-field games which enable us to obtain the decentralized control, in its
general nonlinear setting, through some Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation coupled with Fokker-
Planck (FP) equation. The interested readers may refer the pioneering work [24] for the motivation and
methodology of mean-field games. Based on [24], considerable research attention has been drawn along
this research line. Some recent literature include [5, 8, 13, 18, 19, 20, 25] for linear-quadratic-Gaussian
(LQG) mean-field games of large-population system, [16, 28] for large population systems with major
and minor players, [32] for risk sensitive mean-field games. In addition, the stochastic control problems
with a mean-field term in dynamics and (or) cost functional can be found in [1, 9, 27, 36] etc.
This paper focuses on the study of large-population system in its linear-quadratic (LQ) case (linear
state, quadratic functional) by taking into account the partial information structure. Recall the linear
stochastic system and its related LQ control have already been extensively investigated. One systematic
introduction of stochastic LQ control can be found in the monograph [37] and the references therein.
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It turns out that various stochastic LQ control problems fit into the partial information framework due
to the factors such as finite datum, latent process or noisy observation, etc. An extensive review of LQ
control with partial information is provided in [7] and other related works include [3, 4, 6, 31, 38] etc.
Herein, we turn to study the partial information structures of linear large-population systems. Two cases
of partial information structure are addressed and discussed in our present paper. In the first case, the
individual agents can only access the filtration generated by one observable component of underlying
Brownian motion. The unobservable Brownian motion component may be interpreted as the effect of
a passive version of major player in the context of [16, 28], or be framed into a partial observation
problem (see [7]) in which the sensor function is of zero dynamics. We discuss the related mean-field
LQG games and derive the decentralized strategies which are shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium
property. An approximation scheme is introduced here and the limiting state-average process is actually
driven by the unobservable component of Brownian motion. The consistency condition is further obtained
through some Riccati equations. Some auxiliary mean-field stochastic differential equation (MFSDE) is
introduced and analyzed. In the second case, the individual agents in our large-population system can
access the information on its state by an additive white-noise observation. The decentralized strategies
are derived with the help of Kalman filtering equation to the underlying state. Note that due to intrinsic
approximation scheme of large-population system, the “innovation” process and related Kalman filtering
equation derived here are not defined in their classical sense. The consistency condition is obtained via
two (coupled) Riccati equations. It is notable a class of mean-field LQG games with noisy observations
is also addressed in [17] but defined on an infinite-time horizon so only algebra Riccati equations are
involved. Moreover, the limiting state-average in [17] is deterministic as there has no common noise.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2, 3 study the mean-field LQG games with
partial filtration structure. Specially, Section 2 gives the problem formulation, discusses the related
filtering equation and consistency conditions. Section 3 is devoted to the related ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Section 4 turns to discuss the mean-field LQG games with noisy observation structure. The decentralized
strategies are derived by a Kalman filtering equation but in its large-population sense, and the consistency
condition is represented via two Riccati equations.
2 Mean-Field LQG (MFLQG) Games with Partial Filtration
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for fixed T > 0. For given filtration {Ft}0≤t≤T , let L2F(0, T ;R)
denote the space of all Ft-progressively measurable real-valued processes satisfying E
∫ T
0 |x(t)|2dt < ∞;
L2(0, T ;R) the space of all real functions satisfying
∫ T
0 |x(t)|2dt <∞; L∞(0, T ;R) the space of uniformly
bounded functions. For a given vector or matrix M , M ′ stands for its transpose. (Ω,F , P ) is a complete
probability space on which a standard (N + 1)-dimensional Brownian motion {W (t),Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤
N}0≤t≤T is defined. The information structure of large-population system is as follows. We denote
by {Fwit }0≤t≤T the filtration generated by the component Wi; {Fwt }0≤t≤T the filtration generated by
the component W . Here, {Fwit }0≤t≤T stands for the individual information owning by the ith agent;
{Fwt }0≤t≤T the common information taking effects on all agents. F it := σ(Fwit ∪ Fwt ) represents the full
information of ith agent up to t, Ft := σ(∪Ni=1F it ) denotes the complete information of large-population
system up to t. For simplicity, we set F = FT . In decentralized setup, it is infeasible for the ith
agent to access the information of other agents, i.e., {Fwjt }0≤t≤T for j 6= i. This is reasonable due to
the asymmetric information (for example, the individual firm’s own operation information will not be
released to the public or its peer firms). {Fwt }0≤t≤T can represent the information of some macro process
imposing on all agents (firms) due to the common external economic factors. Such information structure
can be attributed to a passive major player (e.g., the dominating raw-material supplier that affects the
business of all production firms with the same type). Another motivation is from a competitive market
consisting of a large number of small participants with principle-agent contract setup. For instance, the
contracted farms for planting and harvesting. It also denotes the hidden actions of one monopoly or
public environment.
We consider a large-population system with N individual agents {Ai}1≤i≤N . The state xi for Ai
satisfies the following controlled linear stochastic system:
dxi(t) = [A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + αx
(N)(t) +m(t)]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t), xi(0) = x (1)
where x(N)(t) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) is the state-average, α ∈ R is the coupling constant. Here, for simplicity, we
assume all agents are uniform (homogeneous) with the same coefficients (A,B, α,m, σ, σ˜) and determin-
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istic initial states x. Other works discussing the large-population system with common noise W include
[11], [12], [15]. As the first partial information structure, here we assume thatW is a latent process which
is unobservable to individual agents. Thus, the admissible control ui ∈ Ui where the admissible control
set Ui is defined by
Ui := {ui(·)|ui(·) ∈ L2Fwit (0, T ;R)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Remark 2.1 One explanation of above partial filtration structure comes from portfolio selection. Sup-
pose the financial market consists of a risky-free asset dS0 = rS0dt and m risky assets (stocks) satisfying
geometric Brownian motion: dSit = S
i
t(µ
idt + bidWi(t)) with deterministic return rate µ
i and volatility
rate bi for i = 1, · · · ,m. In its general setup, the wealth process for individual agent follows the budget
equation (e.g., see [22]): dXi = (rXi−c(t)+
∑m
j=1 πi,j(t)(µ
j−r))dt+∑mj=1(σ+bjπi,j)dWj+σ˜dW (t). This
is an extended equation of (1) with control-dependent diffusion term. Here, W denotes the capital gain
tax change or taxation exemption (see [11, 30]) which is common to all investors but unobservable during
the current investment horizon [0, T ]. The state-average X(N) enters the dynamics or cost functional of
Xi when considering the relative performance criteria (see [14]). Following [21, 34], in this case, the agent
should choose its optimal consumption and investment strategies ui = (ci, πi) based on the observable
stock prices FSt = σ(∪mj=1Fw
j
t ) only. Further, when considering the hyperplane investment or separation
market (see [14]): m >> N, or m = N , the admissible control of individual agent can be set to be Fwit .
Remark 2.2 Another explanation of above partial filtration structure is as follows. Denote by xi an
individual state variable (e.g., the underlying asset value) of a multinational corporation (MNC) whose
business includes the domestic part and overseas part. Its asset from domestic business is governed by
the idiosyncratic randomness Wi whereas its overseas part mainly relies on the external international
economic factors W (i.e., the international raw-oil price which is common to all motor firms). Suppose
xi is unmarketable thus it is unobservable to the market investors. Instead, the investor can only access
its marketable domestic part, denoted by Sit , which is given by the geometric Brownian motion model
dSit = S
i
t(µ
idt+ σidW it ). Therefore, FS
i
t = Fw
i
t and the investors can make their decisions based on Fw
i
t
hence the partial filtration structure arises.
Let u−i = (u1, · · · , ui−1, ui+1, · · ·uN) the strategies set of all agents except Ai. The cost functional
of Ai is
Ji(ui(·), u−i(·)) = E
[∫ T
0
(
Q(t)(xi(t)− x(N)(t))2 +R(t)u2i (t)
)
dt+Gx2i (T )
]
. (2)
Moreover, we have the following assumption:
(H1)
A(·), B(·),m(·), σ(·), σ˜(·), Q(·), R(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;R),
α ∈ R, Q(·) ≥ 0, R(·) > 0, G ≥ 0.
Now, we formulate the large population LQG games with partial filtration (PF).
Problem (PF). Find a control strategies set u¯ = (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N ) which satisfies
Ji(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)) = inf
ui(·)∈Ui
Ji(ui(·), u¯−i(·))
where u¯−i represents (u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N). To study (PF), one efficient protocol is the mean-field
LQG games which bridges the “centralized” LQG problems via the limiting state-average, as the number
of agents tends to infinity. To this end, we need figure out the representation of limiting process using
heuristic arguments. Based on it, we can find the decentralized strategies by consistency condition. Due
to partial filtration structure, it is natural to set the following feedback control on state filters
uˆi(t) = −a(t)E(xi(t)|Fwit ) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
a˜(t)E(xj(t)|Fwit ) + b(t) (3)
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where the coefficients a(·), a˜(·) and b(·) are deterministic functions and a˜(·) = O( 1
N
). Inserting (3) into
state equation (1), we get the following realized state dynamics
dxi(t) =[A(t)xi(t)−B(t)a(t)E(xi(t)|Fwit ) +B(t)a˜(t)
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(xj(t)|Fwit ) +B(t)b(t)
+ αx(N)(t) +m(t)]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
(4)
Take summation of the above N equations and divide by N ,
d
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t)
)
=
[
A(t)
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t)−B(t)a(t) 1
N
N∑
i=1
E(xi(t)|Fwit ) +B(t)b(t) + αx(N)(t) +m(t)
+B(t)a˜(t)
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(xj(t)|Fwit )
]
dt+ σ(t)
1
N
N∑
i=1
dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t).
Letting N →∞, we obtain the following limiting process which is a mean-field SDE:{
dx0(t) = [(A(t) + α)x0 − α˜(t)Ex0 + b˜(t)]dt+ σ˜(t)dW (t),
x0(0) = x
(5)
where the functions α˜(·), b˜(·) are to be determined. Now, we introduce an auxiliary state as follows:{
dxi(t) = [A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + αx0(t) +m(t)]dt + σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
xi(0) = x
(6)
with the auxiliary cost functional
Ji(ui(·)) = E
[∫ T
0
(
Q(t)(xi(t)− x0(t))2 +R(t)u2i (t)
)
dt+Gx2i (T )
]
(7)
where x0(·) is given by (5). Thus, we formulate the following limiting partial filtration (LPF) LQG game.
Problem (LPF). For the ith agent, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, find u¯i(·) ∈ Ui satisfying
Ji(u¯i(·)) = inf
ui(·)∈Ui
Ji(ui(·)).
Then u¯i(·) is called an optimal control for Problem (LPF).
Remark 2.3 It is worth emphasizing the state process involved in (LPF) is given by (6) which is different
to state in (PF) which is given by (1). Specifically, the latter is affected by the actual state-average x(N).
Here, we still write them in the same notation to ease the presentation.
Applying the variational method, we have the following result to the optimal control of (LPF).
Theorem 2.1 Let (H1) hold. Suppose there exists an optimal control u¯i(·) of Problem (LPF) and x¯i(·)
is the corresponding optimal state, then there exists an adjoint process pi(·) ∈ L2Fi(0, T ;R) satisfying the
following backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):{
dpi(t) =[−A(t)pi(t)−Q(t)(x¯i(t)− x0(t))]dt+ β(t)dWi(t) + β˜(t)dW (t),
pi(T ) =Gx¯i(T ), i = 1, 2, · · · , N
(8)
such that
u¯i(t) = −R−1(t)B(t)E(pi(t)|Fwit )
where the conditional expectation is defined in its optional projection version.
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Consequently, we get the following Hamiltonian system for Ai:
dx0(t) =[(A(t) + α)x0(t)− α˜(t)Ex0(t) + b˜(t)]dt + σ˜(t)dW (t),
dx¯i(t) =[A(t)x¯i(t)− B2(t)R−1(t)E(pi(t)|Fwit ) + αx0(t) +m(t)]dt
+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
dpi(t) =[−A(t)pi(t)−Q(t)(x¯i(t)− x0(t))]dt+ β(t)dWi(t) + β˜(t)dW (t),
x0(0) =x¯i(0) = x, pi(T ) = Gx¯i(T ), i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
(9)
Note that in system (9), the forward optimal state x¯i(·) depends on the backward adjoint process pi(·)
through its filtering state E(pi(t)|Fwit ). In this sense, (9) becomes a filtered FBSDE system and its
decoupling should be proceeded through some FBSDE that involves the filtering state only. To this end,
we introduce the following filter notations
ˆ¯xi(t) = E[x¯i(t)|Fwit ], pˆi(t) = E[pi(t)|Fwit ]
where the conditional expectations to the partial filtration Fwit should be understood in the version of
optional projection. Then we reach a FBSDE system involving the state filters only:
dˆ¯xi(t) =[A(t)ˆ¯xi(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)pˆi(t) + αEx0(t) +m(t)]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t),
ˆ¯xi(0) =x,
dpˆi(t) =[−A(t)pˆi(t)−Q(t)(ˆ¯xi(t)− Ex0(t))]dt+ β(t)dWi(t),
pˆi(T ) =Gˆ¯xi(T ), i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
(10)
Note that system (10) is driven by Wi only so it becomes observable to agent Ai. It can be viewed a
filtering system of (9) that is unobservable as driven by Wi and W both. Taking expectation on (5),{
dEx0(t) =[(A(t) + α− α˜(t))Ex0(t) + b˜(t)]dt,
Ex0(0) =x
(11)
where α˜(·), b˜(·) are functions to be determined. One key step in mean-field game is to analyze the
related consistency condition (which is also called Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle, see [15],
[17], [18], etc). Based on the consistency condition, the limiting state average x0 can be determined in
a consistent manner: the individual feedback close-loop states of all agents, when applying the derived
decentralized strategies, should reformalize the limiting state average at the beginning. As x0 follows (5),
so its determination is equivalent to the determination of coefficient functions (α˜(·), b˜(·)). Thus we aim
to derive the consistency condition satisfied by (α˜(·), b˜(·)). We first state the following result.
Theorem 2.2 Suppose (H1) hold true and the following Riccati equation system
Π˙(t) + (2A(t) + α)Π(t) −B2(t)R−1(t)Π2(t) = 0,
Φ˙(t) + [A(t) −B2(t)R−1(t)Π(t)]Φ(t) +m(t)Π(t) = 0,
Π(T ) = G, Φ(T ) = 0
(12)
admits unique solution (Π(·),Φ(·)), then (α˜(·), b˜(·)) can be uniquely determined by{
α˜(t) = B2(t)R−1(t)Π(t),
b˜(t) = −B2(t)R−1(t)Φ(t) +m(t). (13)
Proof By the terminal condition of (9), we suppose
pˆi(t) = P (t)ˆ¯xi(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t) (14)
for some P (·), Pˆ (·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;R) and Φ(t) ∈ L∞(0, T ;R) with terminal conditions
P (T ) = G, Pˆ (T ) = Φ(T ) = 0.
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Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (14) and noting (9), we have
dpˆi(t) =
(
P˙ (t) + P (t)A(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)P 2(t)
)
ˆ¯xi(t)dt
+
(
˙ˆ
P (t) + Pˆ (t)(A(t) + α− α˜(t)) − P (t)B2(t)R−1(t)Pˆ (t) + αP (t)
)
Ex0(t)dt
+
(
Φ˙(t)− P (t)B2(t)R−1(t)Φ(t) + P (t)m(t) + Pˆ (t)b˜(t)
)
dt+ P (t)σ(t)dWi(t)
=
[
(−Q(t)−A(t)P (t)) ˆ¯xi(t) + (Q(t)−A(t)Pˆ (t))Ex0(t)−A(t)Φ(t)
]
dt+ β(t)dWi(t).
Comparing coefficients, we obtain
P˙ (t) + P (t)A(t) −B2(t)R−1(t)P 2(t) = −Q(t)−A(t)P (t),
˙ˆ
P (t) + Pˆ (t)(A(t) + α− α˜(t))− P (t)B2(t)R−1(t)Pˆ (t) + αP (t) = Q(t)−A(t)Pˆ (t),
Φ˙(t)− P (t)B2(t)R−1(t)Φ(t) + P (t)m(t) + Pˆ (t)b˜(t) = −A(t)Φ(t),
β(t) = P (t)σ(t).
(15)
Note that the above Riccati equations are parameterized by the undetermined functions (α˜(t), b˜(t)) which
are to be specified below. To this end, note that the optimal state x¯i(t) can be represented by
dx¯i(t) =[A(t)x¯i(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)(P (t)ˆ¯xi(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t)) + αx0(t) +m(t)]dt
+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t).
Therefore the state-average satisfies:
dx(N)(t) =
[
A(t)x(N)(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)(P (t) 1
N
N∑
i=1
E(x¯i(t)|Fwit ) + Pˆ (t)
· Ex0(t) + Φ(t)) + αx0(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)
1
N
N∑
i=1
dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t).
Let N → +∞, the limiting process x0 is given by
dx0 =
[
(A+ α)x0 −B2R−1(P + Pˆ )Ex0 −B2R−1Φ+m
]
dt+ σ˜dW. (16)
Comparing the coefficients with (9), we have{
α˜(t) = B2(t)R−1(t)(P (t) + Pˆ (t)),
b˜(t) = −B2(t)R−1(t)Φ(t) +m(t).
(17)
Thus we rewrite (15) as
P˙ (t) + 2A(t)P (t) −B2(t)R−1(t)P 2(t) +Q(t) = 0,
˙ˆ
P (t) + Pˆ (t)[2A(t) + α−B2(t)R−1(t)(P (t) + Pˆ (t))−B2(t)R−1(t)P (t)] + αP (t) −Q(t) = 0,
Φ˙(t) + [A(t) − (P (t) + Pˆ (t))B2(t)R−1(t)]Φ(t) + (P (t) + Pˆ (t))m(t) = 0,
P (T ) = G, Pˆ (T ) = Φ(T ) = 0.
Letting Π(t) = P (t) + Pˆ (t), we get{
Π˙(t) + (2A(t) + α)Π(t) −B2(t)R−1(t)Π2(t) = 0,
Π(T ) = G.
(18)
Moreover, the filtering system (10) can be decoupled as
dˆ¯xi(t) =
[(
A(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)P (t)
)
ˆ¯xi(t) +
(
α−B2(t)R−1(t)(Π(t) − P (t))
)
Ex0(t)
−B2(t)R−1(t)Φ(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t),
pˆi(t) = P (t)ˆ¯xi(t) + (Π(t)− P (t))Ex0(t) + Φ(t),
ˆ¯xi(0) = xi(0), pˆi(T ) = Gˆ¯xi(T ).
(19)
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Taking average of all and sending N → +∞, we regenerate{
dEx0 =[(A+ α−B2R−1Π)Ex0 −B2R−1Φ +m]dt,
Ex0(0) = x.
(20)
Remark 2.4 To conclude this section, we give some remarks concerning to Theorem 2.2.
(1) Unlike most literature on mean-field LQG games, there has no fixed-point arguments explicitly
involved here (e.g., some contraction mapping based on the datum of our problem) to characterize the
consistency condition. Instead, our consistency condition is transformed into the wellposedness of Riccati
equation system (12). Actually, (Pˆ (·),Φ(·)) depend on (α˜(·), b˜(·)), thus (17) can be rewritten by{
α˜ = T1(α˜) := B2R−1(P + Pˆ (α˜)),
b˜ = T2(b˜) := −B2R−1Φ(α˜, b˜) +m.
In this sense, (12) can be understood as the consistency condition of (LPF) .
(2) By [36], [37], it follows P (·) is determined uniquely as a nonnegative constant. One sufficient
condition for the existence and uniqueness of Π(·) can be found in [26] hence the solvability of Pˆ (·) follows
directly by noting Π(t) = P (t) + Pˆ (t). In addition, the solvability of Φ(·) follows from that of Π(·).
(3) The advantages of handling the consistency condition of (α˜(·), b˜(·)) are as follows. The consis-
tency condition imposed on (α˜(·), b˜(·)) is equivalent to the wellposedness of Riccati equation (12) which
can be ensured in an arbitrary time interval. On the other hand, as addressed in [10], the fixed-point
analysis on x will preferably lead to the consistency condition defined only on a small time interval. This
finding is also response to the standard result in forward-backward SDE theory: as discussed in [2], the
usual contraction mapping on forward-backward system will always lead to its existence and uniqueness
in a very small time interval. This should also be the case in mean-field games where the “backward”
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is coupled with the “forward” Fokker-Planck (FP) equation.
3 ǫ-Nash Equilibrium for Problem (PF)
Now we show that (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N ) satisfies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (PF).
Definition 3.1 A set of controls uk(·) ∈ Uk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N, for N agents is called an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
with respect to the costs Jk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N, if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such that for any fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
Ji(ui, u−i) ≤ Ji(u′i, u−i) + ǫ (21)
when any alternative control u′i(·) ∈ Ui is applied by Ai.
Theorem 3.1 Let (H1) hold and (12) admit a solution (Π,Φ), then (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N ) satisfies the ǫ-Nash
equilibrium of Problem (PF). Here, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, u¯i is given by
u¯i(t) = −R−1(t)B(t)
[
P (t)ˆ¯xi(t) + (Π(t)− P (t))Ex0(t) + Φ(t)
]
(22)
where ˆ¯xi and Ex0 satisfy (19) and (20) respectively.
As preliminaries of proving the theorem, several lemmas are presented and proved to proceed some
estimates on the state and cost difference between Problem (PF) and (LPF). Recall that
dx¯i(t) =
[
A(t)x¯i(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
P (t)ˆ¯xi(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t)
)
+ αx0(t) +m(t)
]
dt
+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
dˆ¯xi(t) =
[(
A(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)P (t)
)
ˆ¯xi(t) +
(
α−B2(t)R−1(t)Pˆ (t)
)
Ex0(t)
−B2(t)R−1(t)Φ(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t),
x¯i(0) =ˆ¯xi(t) = xi(0),
(23)
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and denote
x¯(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
x¯i(t), ˆ¯x
(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ˆ¯xi(t).
Here, x¯(N)(t) denotes the average of state (in Problem (LPF)) while ˆ¯x(N) denotes the average of filtered
states. Note that ˆ¯xi(t) is driven by Wi only thus it is observable to the individual agent Ai. It enters the
state dynamics in (23) as an input process when applying the optimal strategy constructed on it. Some
estimates are as follows.
Lemma 3.1
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣ ˆ¯x(N)(t)− Ex0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (24)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣x¯(N)(t)− x0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
. (25)
Proof See Appendix A.
Denote yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, the state of Ai to the control u¯i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N in Problem (PI), namely,
dyi(t) =
[
A(t)yi(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
P (t)ˆ¯xi(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t)
)
+ αy(N)(t)
+m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
yi(0) =xi(0)
(26)
where y(N)(t) = 1
N
∑N
j=1 yj(t).
By the difference of states corresponding to u¯i in (PI) and (LPI), we have the following estimates:
Lemma 3.2
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣y(N)(t)− x0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (27)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣yi(t)− x¯i(t)∣∣∣2] = O( 1
N
)
, (28)
sup
1≤i≤N
[
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|yi(t)|2 − |x¯i(t)|2∣∣∣] = O( 1√
N
)
. (29)
Proof By (26) and (19), the estimate (27) can be verified by the same method in Lemma 3.1. According
to (26) and (23), we have d
(
yi(t)− x¯i(t)
)
=
[
A(t)(yi(t)− x¯i(t)) + α(y(N)(t)− x0(t))
]
dt,
yi(0)− x¯i(0) = 0.
Thus, (28) follows from (27). Since sup0≤t≤T E|x¯i(t)|2 < +∞, applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we
get
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|yi(t)|2 − |x¯i(t)|2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E|yi(t)− x¯i(t)|2 + 2 sup
0≤t≤T
E|x¯i(t)(yi(t)− x¯i(t))|
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E|yi(t)− x¯i(t)|2 + 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|x¯i(t)|2
) 1
2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|yi(t)− x¯i(t)|2
) 1
2
=O
( 1√
N
)
which completes the proof.
As to the difference of cost functionals, it holds
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Lemma 3.3 For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, ∣∣∣Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− Ji(u¯i)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
. (30)
Proof See Appendix B.
After addressing the above estimates of states and costs corresponding to control u¯i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , given
by (22), our goal is to prove that the control strategies set (u¯1, · · · , u¯N) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
Problem (PI). For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , consider an admissible control ui ∈ Ui for Ai and denote zi
the corresponding state process in Problem (PI), that is dzi(t) =
[
A(t)zi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + αz
(N)(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
zi(0) =xi(0)
(31)
whereas other agents keep the control u¯j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i, i.e.,
dzj(t) =
[
A(t)zj(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
P (t)ˆ¯xj(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t)
)
+ αz(N)(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWj(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
zj(0) =xj(0)
(32)
where z(N)(t) = 1
N
∑N
j=1 zj(t) and ˆ¯xj(t) is given by (23). If u¯i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with
respect to cost Ji, it holds that
Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) ≥ inf
ui∈Ui
Ji(ui, u¯−i) ≥ Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− ǫ.
Then, when making the perturbation, we just need to consider ui ∈ Ui such that Ji(ui, u¯−i) ≤ Ji(u¯i, u¯−i),
which implies
E
∫ T
0
R(t)u2i (t)dt ≤ Ji(ui, u¯−i) ≤ Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) = Ji(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
In the limiting cost functional, by the optimality of (x¯i, u¯i), we get that (x¯i, u¯i) is L
2-bounded. Then we
obtain the boundedness of Ji(u¯i), i.e.,
E
∫ T
0
R(t)u2i (t)dt ≤ C0 (33)
where C0 is a positive constant, independent of N . Thus we have
Propsition 3.1 For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , sup
0≤t≤T
E|zi(t)|2 is bounded.
Proof See Appendix C.
Correspondingly, the state process x¯0i for agent Ai under control ui in Problem (LPI) satisfies dx¯
0
i (t) =
[
A(t)x¯0i (t) +B(t)ui(t) + αx0(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
x¯0i (0) =xi(0)
(34)
and for agent Aj , j 6= i,
dx¯j(t) =
[
A(t)x¯j(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
P (t)ˆ¯xj(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t)
)
+ αx0(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWj(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
x¯j(0) =xj(0)
(35)
where ˆ¯xj and x0 are given in (19).
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In order to give necessary estimates of perturbed states and costs in Problem (PI) and (LPI), we
introduce some intermediate states and present some of their properties. Denote
z(N−1)(t) =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
zj(t), ˆ¯x
(N−1)(t) =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ˆ¯xj(t).
Then by (32), we have
dz(N−1)(t) =
[
(A(t) +
N − 1
N
α)z(N−1)(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
P (t)ˆ¯x(N−1)(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t)
+ Φ(t)
)
+
α
N
zi(t) +m(t)
]
dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σ(t)dWj(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
z(N−1)(0) =x(N−1)(0)
(36)
where x(N−1)(0) = 1
N−1
∑N
j=1,j 6=i xj(0). Besides, we introduce
dzˇi(t) =
[
A(t)zˇi(t) +B(t)ui(t) +
N − 1
N
αzˇ(N−1)(t) +m(t)
]
dt
+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
zˇi(0) =xi(0)
(37)
and for j 6= i, 
dzˇj(t) =
[
A(t)zˇj(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
P (t)ˆ¯xj(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t)
)
+
N − 1
N
αzˇ(N−1)(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ σ(t)dWj(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
zˇj(0) =xj(0)
(38)
where zˇ(N−1)(t) = 1
N−1
∑N
j=1,j 6=i zˇj(t).
We have the following estimates on these states.
Propsition 3.2
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣ˆ¯x(N−1)(t)− Ex0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (39)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣z(N)(t)− z(N−1)(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (40)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zˇ(N−1)(t)− z(N−1)(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N2
)
, (41)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zˇ(N−1)(t)− x0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (42)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zi(t)− zˇi(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N2
)
, (43)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zˇi(t)− x¯0i (t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1N ). (44)
Proof See Appendix D.
Further, more direct estimates about states and costs of Problem (PI) and (LPI) under perturbed
controls can be obtained, which enable us to prove Theorem 3.1.
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Lemma 3.4
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zi(t)− x¯0i (t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1N ), (45)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣z(N)(t)− x0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
, (46)
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|zi(t)|2 − |x¯0i (t)|2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
, (47)∣∣∣Ji(ui, u¯−i)− Ji(ui)∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
. (48)
Proof See Appendix E.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Consider the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for Ai. Combining Lemma 3.3 and 3.4, we
have
Ji(u¯i, u¯−i) = Ji(u¯i) +O
( 1√
N
)
≤ Ji(ui) +O
( 1√
N
)
= Ji(ui, u¯−i) +O
( 1√
N
)
.
Thus, Theorem 3.1 follows by taking ǫ = O
(
1√
N
)
.
4 Mean-Field LQG (MFLQG) Games with Partial Observation
We consider a large population system with noisy observation as follows. The state xi for each Ai still
satisfies the following linear stochastic system:
dxi(t) = [A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + αx
(N)(t) +m(t)]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t), xi(0) = x (49)
with x(N)(t) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t). We still assume the initial states xi(0) are deterministic and same for all
agents. The ith agent Ai can access the following additive white-noise partial observation:
dyi(t) = [H(t)xi(t) + H˜(t)x
(N)(t) + h(t)]dt + dVi(t). (50)
Here, {Vi}1≤i≤N , {Wi}1≤i≤N ,W are independent Brownian motions. Define the observable filtration of
Ai as Git := σ{yi(s),W (s); 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. In what follows, for simplicity, we focus on the one-dimensional
case. The admissible control ui ∈ Ui where the admissible control set Ui is defined as
Ui := {ui(·)|ui(·) ∈ L2Git(0, T ;R)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Let u = (u1, · · ·ui, · · · , uN) still denote the set of control strategies of all N agents; u−i = (u1, · · · , ui−1,
ui+1, · · ·uN ) the control strategies set except the ith agent Ai. Introduce the cost functional of Ai as
Ji(ui(·), u−i(·)) = E
[∫ T
0
(
Q(t)
(
xi(t)− x(N)(t)
)2
+R(t)u2i (t)
)
dt+Gx2i (T )
]
. (51)
For the coefficients of (49), (50) and (51), we set the following assumption:
(H2) H(·), H˜(·), h(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;R).
Now, we formulate the large population LQG games with partial observation (PO).
Problem (PO). Find a control strategies set u¯ = (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N) which satisfies
Ji(u¯i(·), u¯−i(·)) = inf
ui(·)∈Ui
Ji(ui(·), u¯−i(·))
where u¯−i represents (u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N ).
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To study (PO) and obtain the decentralized individual strategies, a key step is to approximate the
state-average. To this end, we define the state filter for the given filtration Git as
xˆi(t) = E(xi(t)|Git).
Then xˆ(N)(t) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xˆi(t) denotes the average of state filters. This is very different to the full-
information analysis of large-population system in which we need only study the average of state itself.
Applying the similar analysis as in Section 2, x(N) and xˆ(N) are approximated by x0 and xˆ respectively
which are given by 
dx0(t) = [A˜(t)x0(t) + B˜(t)xˆ(t) + f(t)]dt+ σ˜(t)dW (t),
dxˆ(t) = [C(t)x0(t) +D(t)xˆ(t) + g(t)]dt,
x0(0) = xˆ(0) = x
(52)
where (A˜(·), B˜(·), C(·), D(·)) ∈ L2(0, T ;R) and (f(·), g(·)) ∈ L2Gwt (0, T ;R) are to be determined. It follows
that the individual state filters in our partial observation case are no longer independent. This is different
to the previous partial filtration case in Section 2, 3 where the state filters are independent thus only its
expectation is needed. Therefore, here we need average all state filters by considering their conditional
independence on filtration {Gwt }0≤t≤T . Now, we introduce the limiting partial-observation state and
limiting observation as follows:{
dxi(t) = [A(t)xi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + αx0(t) +m(t)]dt + σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
xi(0) = x
(53)
and
dy¯i(t) = [H(t)xi(t) + H˜(t)x0(t) + h(t)]dt+ dVi(t). (54)
Note that the auxiliary state xi(·) is different from that in (49) although they apply the same notations.
The limiting cost functional is given by
Ji(ui(·)) = E
[∫ T
0
(
Q(t)
(
xi(t)− x0(t)
)2
+R(t)u2i (t)
)
dt+Gx2i (T )
]
(55)
where x0(·) is given by (52). Now we formulate the following limiting partial observation (LPO) LQG
game.
Problem (LPO). For the ith agent, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, find u¯i(·) ∈ Ui satisfying
Ji(u¯i(·)) = inf
ui(·)∈Ui
Ji(ui(·)).
Then u¯i(·) is called an optimal control for Problem (LPO).
As to the optimal control with partial observation (see [7]), we have
dxˆi(t) =
[
A(t)xˆi(t) +B(t)ui(t) + αx0(t) +m(t)
]
dt+ P (t)H(t)dW (t)
+ P (t)H(t)
[
dy¯i(t) − (H(t)xˆi(t) + H˜(t)x0(t) + h(t))dt
]
,
xˆi(0) =x
(56)
where P (·) ∈ L2(0, T ;R) is the unique solution of the Riccati equation{
P˙ (t) = 2A(t)P (t)−H2(t)P 2(t) + σ2(t) + σ˜2(t),
P (0) = 0.
(57)
Now, we introduce some notations:
Xi(·) =
 xi(·)x0(·)
xˆ(·)
 , Xˆi(·) =
 xˆi(·)x0(·)
xˆ(·)
 ,A(·) =
 A(·) α 00 A˜(·) B˜(·)
0 C(·) D(·)
 ,
B(·) =
 B(·)0
0
 , F(·) =
 m(·)f(·)
g(·)
 , Σ(·) =
 P (·)H(·) P (·)H(·)0 σ˜(·)
0 0
 ,
Q(·) =
 Q(·) −Q(·) 0−Q(·) Q(·) 0
0 0 0
 ,G =
 G 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , I =
 11
1
 .
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Introduce the innovation process
Ii(t) := y¯i(t)−
∫ t
0
[H(s)xˆi(s) + H˜(s)x0(s) + h(s)]ds.
Then the system (52), (53) and (55) can be rewritten as
dXˆi(t) =
[
A(t)Xˆi(t) + B(t)ui(t) + F(t)
]
dt+Σ(t)
(
dIi(t)
dW (t)
)
, Xˆi(0) = xI (58)
with
Ji(ui(·)) = E
[∫ T
0
(
X ′i(t)Q(t)Xi(t) +R(t)u
2
i (t)
)
dt+X ′i(T )GXi(T )
]
. (59)
Given two functions π(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;R3×3) and γ(·) ∈ L∞Gwt (0, T ;R3×1) satisfying{
π˙(t) + π(t)A(t) + A′(t)π(t) −R−1(t)π(t)B(t)B′(t)π(t) +Q(t) = 0,
π(T ) = G
(60)
and {
dγ(t) + [(A′(t)−R−1(t)π(t)B(t)B′(t))γ(t) + π(t)F(t)]dt + q(t)dW (t) = 0,
γ(T ) = 0
(61)
respectively. We have
Lemma 4.1 Let (H1)-(H2) hold. Assume (60) and (61) admit unique solutions π(·) and (γ(·), q(·)),
then if the optimal control of Problem (LPO) exist, it can be represented by
u¯i(t) = −R−1(t)B′(t)π(t)Xˆi(t)−R−1(t)B′(t)γ(t).
The proof can be seen in [7] and omitted. Now, we aim to derive the consistency condition satisfied by
the decentralized control policy. From (60), we get that π(·) is symmetric and denote (π(·), γ(·)) as
π(·) =
 π11(·) π12(·) π13(·)π12(·) π22(·) π23(·)
π13(·) π23(·) π33(·)
 , γ(·) =
 γ1(·)γ2(·)
γ3(·)
 .
Then the optimal control u¯i(t) is rewritten as
u¯i(t) = −R−1(t)B(t)
(
π11(t)xˆi(t) + π12(t)x0(t) + π13xˆ(t) + γ1(t)
)
. (62)
Plugging (62) into (49), we have
dxi(t) =[A(t)xi(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
π11(t)xˆi(t) + π12(t)x0(t) + π13xˆ(t) + γ1(t)
)
+ αx(N)(t) +m(t)]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t).
Taking summation, dividing by N and letting N → +∞, we obtain
dx0(t) =
[(
A(t) + α−B2(t)R−1(t)π12(t)
)
x0(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
π11(t) + π13(t)
)
xˆ(t)
−B2(t)R−1(t)γ1(t) +m(t)
]
+ σ˜(t)dW (t).
(63)
Comparing the coefficients with (52), we have
A˜(t) = A(t) + α−B2(t)R−1(t)π12(t),
B˜(t) = −B2(t)R−1(t)(π11(t) + π13(t)),
f(t) = −B2(t)R−1(t)γ1(t) +m(t).
(64)
13
From (56) and (62) it follows that
dxˆi(t) =
[
A(t)xˆi(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
π11(t)xˆi(t) + π12(t)x0(t) + π13xˆ(t) + γ1(t)
)
+ αx0(t) +m(t)
]
dt
+ P (t)H(t)dW (t) + P (t)H(t)
[(
H(t)xi(t)−H(t)xˆi(t)
)
dt+ dVi(t)
]
.
Taking summation, dividing by N and letting N → +∞, we get
dxˆ(t) =
[(
A(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)(π11(t) + π13(t))− P (t)H2(t))xˆ(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)γ1(t) +m(t)
+
(
α−B2(t)R−1(t)π12(t) + P (t)H2(t)
)
x0(t)
]
dt+ P (t)H(t)dW (t).
(65)
Comparing the coefficients with (52), we obtain
C(t) = α−B2(t)R−1(t)π12(t) + P (t)H2(t),
D(t) = A(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)(π11(t) + π13(t))− P (t)H2(t),
g(t) = −B2(t)R−1(t)γ1(t) +m(t).
(66)
Thus, noting f(·), g(·) and γ(T ) = 0 in (61), we get that γ(·) is deterministic. Then the uniqueness of
BSDE implies q(·) ≡ 0. Then we have
Theorem 4.1 Suppose (H1)-(H2) hold true and the following Riccati equation system
P˙ (t)− 2A(t)P (t) +H2(t)P 2(t)− (σ2(t) + σ˜2(t)) = 0, P (0) = 0,
π˙(t) + π(t)A(t) + A′(t)π(t) −R−1π(t)B(t)B′(t)π(t) +Q(t) = 0, π(T ) = G,
γ˙(t) +
(
A′(t)−R−1(t)π(t)B(t)B′(t))γ(t) + π(t)F(t) = 0, γ(T ) = 0 (67)
admits an unique solution (P (·), π(·), γ(·)) and (A˜, B˜, C,D, f, g) are uniquely determined by (64) and
(66). Moreover, the SDE system
dx0(t) =
[(
A(t) + α−B2(t)R−1(t)π12(t)
)
x0(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
(
π11(t) + π13(t)
)
xˆ(t)
−B2(t)R−1(t)γ1(t) +m(t)
]
+ σ˜(t)dW (t),
dxˆ(t) =
[(
α−B2(t)R−1(t)π12(t) + P (t)H2(t)
)
x0(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)γ1(t) +m(t)
+
(
A(t) −B2(t)R−1(t)(π11(t) + π13(t))− P (t)H2(t))xˆ(t)]dt+ P (t)H(t)dW (t),
x0(0) = xˆ(0) = x
(68)
admits an unique solution (x0(·), xˆ(·)) and the decentralized optimal strategies are given by (62).
The proof is similar to that of Section 3 and omitted.
Remark 4.1 Similar to Section 3, the resultant (u¯1, u¯2, · · · , u¯N ) satisfies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
Problem (PO). The equation system (67)-(68) combined will be called the consistency condition. This
is similar to the analysis in [16] and we know the solvability of the consistency condition (67)-(68) is
essentially reduced to the solvability of (67). Once a consistent solution to (67) is obtained, a consistent
solution to SDEs (68) is guaranteed.
The authors would like to thank the editors and reviewers for their valuable and efficient work.
5 Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3.1. By (19) and (23), we have
d
(
ˆ¯x(N)(t)− Ex0(t)
)
=
(
A(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)P (t)
)(
ˆ¯x(N)(t)− Ex0(t)
)
dt
+
1
N
σ(t)
N∑
i=1
dWi(t),
ˆ¯x(N)(0)− Ex0(0) = x(N)(0)− x.
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Thus ∣∣∣ˆ¯x(N)(t)− Ex0(t)∣∣∣2 ≤3∣∣∣x(N)(0)− x∣∣∣2 + 3 ∫ t
0
∣∣∣A(s)−B2(s)R−1(s)P (s)∣∣∣2
·
∣∣∣ˆ¯x(N)(s)− Ex0(s)∣∣∣2ds+ 3∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
1
N
σ(s)
N∑
i=1
dWi(s)
∣∣∣2.
By the independence of {Wi(t)}t≥0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
E
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
1
N
σ(s)
N∑
i=1
dWi(s)
∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
.
So (24) follows by Gronwall’s inequality. Combining with (24), the assertion (25) can be proved in a
similar way. 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3.3. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2, we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|yi(t)− y(N)(t)|2 − |x¯i(t)− x0(t)|2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣yi(t)− x¯i(t) + x0(t)− y(N)(t)∣∣∣2
+2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|x¯i(t)− x0(t)|2
) 1
2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|yi(t)− x¯i(t) + x0(t)− y(N)(t)|2
) 1
2
.
By Lemma 3.2, it follows that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣yi(t)− x¯i(t) + x0(t)− y(N)(t)∣∣∣2
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣yi(t)− x¯i(t)∣∣∣2 + sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣y(N)(t)− x0(t)∣∣∣2
=O
( 1
N
)
.
Then, combining with the fact that sup
0≤t≤T
E|x¯i(t)− x0(t)|2 < +∞, we obtain
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|yi(t)− y(N)(t)|2 − |x¯i(t)− x0(t)|2∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
)
.
Thus, ∣∣∣Ji(u¯i, u¯−i)− Ji(u¯i)∣∣∣
≤E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q(t)(yi(t)− y(N)(t))2 −Q(t)(x¯i(t)− x0(t))2∣∣∣dt+ E∣∣∣Gy2i (T )−Gx¯2i (T )∣∣∣
=O
( 1√
N
)
.
The assertion (30) follows. 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3.1. By (31) and (32), it holds that
|zi(t)|2 ≤4|xi(0)|2 + 4K
∫ t
0
[
|zi(s)|2 + |ui(s)|2 + 1
N
N∑
k=1
|zk(s)|2 + |m(s)|2
]
ds
+ 4
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σ(s)dWi(s)
∣∣∣2 + 4∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σ˜(s)dW (s)
∣∣∣2
and for j 6= i,
|zj(t)|2 ≤4|xj(0)|2 + 4K
∫ t
0
[
|zj(s)|2 + |u¯j(s)|2 + 1
N
N∑
k=1
|zk(s)|2 + |m(s)|2
]
ds
+ 4
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σ(s)dWj(s)
∣∣∣2 + 4∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σ˜(s)dW (s)
∣∣∣2
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where K := max
0≤t≤T
(
A2(t) +B2(t)
)
+ α2. Thus,
E
[ N∑
k=1
|zk(t)|2
]
≤4E
[ N∑
k=1
|xk(0)|2
]
+ 4KE
∫ t
0
[
2
N∑
k=1
|zk(s)|2 + |ui(s)|2 +
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
|u¯k(s)|2
+N |m(s)|2
]
ds+ 4
N∑
k=1
E
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σ(s)dWk(s)
∣∣∣2 + 4NE∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
σ˜(s)dW (s)
∣∣∣2.
By (33), we can see that E|ui(t)|2 is bounded. Besides, the optimal controls u¯k(t), k 6= i are L2-bounded.
Then by Gronwall’s inequality, it follows that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
[ N∑
k=1
|zk(t)|2
]
= O(N),
and sup
0≤t≤T
E|zi(t)|2 is bounded. 
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3.2. From (38), it follows that
dzˇ(N−1)(t) =
[
(A(t) +
N − 1
N
α)zˇ(N−1)(t)−B2(t)R−1(t)
·
(
P (t)ˆ¯x(N−1)(t) + Pˆ (t)Ex0(t) + Φ(t)
)
+m(t)
]
dt
+
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σ(t)dWj(t) + σ˜(t)dW (t),
zˇ(N−1)(0) =x(N−1)(0).
(69)
Then we have d
(
zˇ(N−1)(t)− z(N−1)(t)
)
=
[
(A(t) +
N − 1
N
α)
(
zˇ(N−1)(t)− z(N−1)(t)
)
− α
N
zi(t)
]
dt,
zˇ(N−1)(0)− z(N−1)(0) = 0.
By the L2-boundness of zi(t) and Gronwall’s inequality, the assertions (40) and (41) hold. And by (24),
we can get (39). Besides, it follows that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zˇ(N−1)(t)− x0(t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1
N
)
from (69), (19) and (39). Then (34), (37) and (42) imply that
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zˇi(t)− x¯0i (t)∣∣∣2 = O( 1N ).
Finally, by Proposition 3.1, we easily get (43). 
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 3.4. (45) and (46) follow from Proposition 3.2 directly. By
Proposition 3.1, we get that both sup0≤t≤T E|x¯0i (t)|2 and sup0≤t≤T E|x¯0i (t)−x0(t)|2 are bounded. Similar
to the proof of Lemma 3.2, we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|zi(t)|2 − |x¯0i (t)|2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E|zi(t)− x¯0i (t)|2 + 2 sup
0≤t≤T
E|x¯0i (t)(zi(t)− x¯0i (t))|
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E|zi(t)− x¯0i (t)|2 + 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|x¯0i (t)|2
) 1
2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zi(t)− x¯0i (t)|2
) 1
2
=O
( 1√
N
)
,
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thus (47) holds. Besides,
sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣|zi(t)− z(N)(t)|2 − |x¯0i (t)− x0(t)|2∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤t≤T
E
∣∣∣zi(t)− x¯0i (t) + x0(t)− z(N)(t)∣∣∣2
+ 2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|x¯0i (t)− x0(t)|2
) 1
2
(
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zi(t)− x¯0i (t) + x0(t)− z(N)(t)|2
) 1
2
=O
( 1√
N
)
,
then ∣∣∣Ji(ui, u¯−i)− Ji(ui)∣∣∣
≤E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣Q(t)(zi(t)− z(N)(t))2 −Q(t)(x¯0i (t)− x0(t))2∣∣∣dt+ E∣∣∣Gz2i (T )−G(x¯0i (T ))2∣∣∣
=O
( 1√
N
)
,
which implies (48). 
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